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TAXATION-LIENS-PRIORITY OF A SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL TAX 
LIEN OVER AN ANTECEDENT INCHOATE LIEN-The recent decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Liverpool 
and London & Globe Ins. Co.1 is representative of a line of Su-
preme Court cases since 1950 in which the Court has had to de-
cide whether a statutory lien2 that is prior in time to a federal tax 
1348 U.S. 215, 75 S.Ct. 247 (1955) . 
.2 The term "statutory lien" is used here in a broad sense to include garnishment, 
attachment, distraint, mechanics' and state and local tax liens. These are non-consensual 
liens which are created by the ex parte action of the creditor. This comment concentrates 
on the garnishment lien, but what may be said of this type of lien generally applies to the 
other types. 
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lien3 is also prior in right. These cases uniformly hold that a 
creditor, having an inchoate lien prior in right to most subsequent 
interests that may be acquired in the liened property, must make 
his lien specific and perfected before a federal· tax lien comes into 
existence in order to protect and preserve its priority against the 
subsequent tax lien. Illustratively, in the Liverpool case, a credi-
tor started an action against a solvent debtor (the taxpayer) and 
garnished a debt claim held by that debtor against an insurance 
company (the garnishee). The service of a writ of garnishment 
created a lien on the garnished debt giving the lienor, under state 
law,4 a right to satisfaction from the garnished debt superior to the 
right of other interests which might subsequently be acquired in 
that property, even though acquired before the lienor had ob-
tained a judgment.6 Before the creditor could obtain a judgment 
in the Liverpool case, a federal tax lien arose and was recorded. 
The Court subordinated the earlier, but "inchoate," garnishment 
lien to the later tax lien. 
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the rationale, in 
terms of both statutory construction and policy, of the theory that 
only a choate garnishment lien is superior to a subsequent tax lien. 
L DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHOATE LIEN DOCTRINE 
To facilitate the collection of taxes, section 6321 of the Internal 
Revenue Code provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neg-
lects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall 
be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights 
to property ... belonging to such person." 
The existence of a tax lien in no way depends upon the finan-
cial condition of a taxpayer. On the other hand, to assure the 
collection of debts of any type due the United States in the event 
that a debtor becomes insolvent, the priority statute, section 3466 
of the Revised Statutes, provides: "Whenever any person indebted 
to the United States is insolvent ... the debts due to the United 
States shall be first satisfied .... "6 
3 I.R.C. (1954), §6321, formerly I.R.C. (1939), §3670. It should be stressed that this 
comment is concerned solely with the situation where the statutory lien is created first and 
the tax lien aftenvard. 
4 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1951) art. 4084; United States v. Standard Brass & Mfg. Co., 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 266 S.W. (2d) 407. 
6 The fiction that the lien "merges" in the judgment and "relates back" to the time of 
creation e."Xpresses the state policy that the priority of a lien must relate back beyond 
judgment if the lien is to be of any value. Anderson v. Ashford, 174 Ga. 660, 163 S.E. 741 
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For many years prior to 1950 the Government argued that the 
priority of a tax lien should be correlated with the priority sta-
tute, so that a tax lien would be prior to an antecedent "inchoate" 
lien even though the taxpayer was solvent. State and lower federal 
courts refused to correlate the two statutes on the basis that the 
language of the tax lien statute did not justify a correlative con-
struction.7 The first case involving this issue to come before the 
Supreme Court, United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,8 
decided that an antecedent statutory lien on the property of a 
solvent taxpayer must also be choate in order to prevail over a 
later federal tax lien. The opinion of that case clearly indicated 
that the Court adopted the choate lien doctrine as developed in 
the insolvency cases decided under the priority statute.9 Because 
of this parallel construction, a profitable analysis of the choate lien 
doctrine as applied in the tax lien cases requires a preliminary 
consideration of its development in the insolvency cases arising 
under section 3466. 
The early case of Thelusson v. Smith10 was decided under the• 
Act of 179911 (a predecessor to section 3466) which provided that 
" .. in all cases of insolvency ... debts due to the United States ... 
shall be first satisfied." The issue in that case was whether this act 
gave the United States a right to satisfy its claims from the land of 
the insolvent debtor prior to the right of a judgment creditor who 
had a general judgment lien upon all of the debtor's undescribed 
land, but who had not divested the debtor of his land by a levy 
prior to the debtor's insolvency. The decision in favor of the 
Government could have been based on the single sentence: 
"[T]he law makes no exception in favor of prior judgment 
creditors .... " The sweeping statement that the provisions of the 
(1932); Board of Supervisors v. Hart, 210 La. 78, 26 S. (2d) 361 (1946); United States 
Fidelity &: Guaranty Co. v. United States, (10th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 118. 
6 R.S. §3466 (1875), ~l U.S.C. (1952) §191. "Debts" include taxes. Price v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 492, 46 S.Ct. 180 (1926). Insolvency must be·manifested by an act of bank· 
ruptcy, a general assignment, or an attachment of the effects of an absconding debtor 
before the priority arises. 
7 See Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious 
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien," 63 YALE L.J. 905 at 924, n. 115 (1954). This 
construction is still rejected. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 
227 F. (2d) 359, revd. without majority opinion (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 646. 
s 340 U.S. 47, 71 S.Ct. 111 (1950). 
9 "In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority under R.S. §3466, it 
has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien ..• con-
tingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it. ••• If the purpose of the federal 
tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes ... is to be fulfilled, a 
similar rule must prevail here." Id. at 51. 
10 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 396 (1817). 
111 Stat. L. 676 (1799). 
832 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
statute "exclude all debts due to individuals, whatever may be 
their dignity," was totally unnecessary under the facts of the case. 
The absolute priority implicit in this dictum caused the Court to 
add the further dictum that there were exceptions to the priority. 
Thus, if before the debtor becomes insolvent the property has been 
conveyed or mortgaged, "or if the property has been seized under 
a fi. fa., the property is divested out of the debtor, and cannot be 
made liable to the United States."12 
It was contended in Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co.13 that the The-
lusson case meant that the priority granted by section 3466 was su-
perior to any lien and that only an absolute conveyance could de-
feat the priority. The Court answered that "it has never yet been 
decided ... that the priority of the United States will divest a 
specific lien ... whether it be accompanied by possession or not."14 
The result of the Thelusson case was explained on the grounds 
that the judgment creditor, with an unexecuted general judgment 
lien on the debtor's land, had no interest in the land unless and 
·until he perfected his lien by execution divesting the debtor of 
title. Because the debtor's title had not been divested before the 
Government's priority attached, the land was still a part of the in-
solvent's estate from which the Government was entitled to receive 
prior satisfaction. This explanation limited the broad dictum of 
the Thelusson case.16 The Conard case was the beginning of a 
line of cases16 which never mentioned the choate lien concept, but 
held that antecedent statutory liens prevailed over the priority 
provision of section 3466, even though the lienors had not levied 
on or otherwise divested the title from the debtor prior to his in-
solvency, a defect which would have been fatal under the broad 
language of the Thelusson case. 
In Spokane County v. United States17 the Government's un-
secured debts against an insolvent's estate were given priority over 
12 2 Wheat. (195 U.S.) 396 at 425 (1817). 
13 I Pet. (26 U.S.) 386 (1828). 
14 Id. at 441. 
15 The concurring opinion in Conard thought that this overruled Thelusson. The 
majority opinion in Conard also mentioned that the reasons for the Thelusson opinion 
were not fully reported due to "accidental circumstances." See I WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 455 to 460 (1922). . 
16 See Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious 
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien,''. 63 YALE L.J. 905 at 911 (1954); Rogge, "The 
Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiver-
ships,'' 43 HARV. L. REV. 251 at 268 (1929). 
17 279 U.S. 80, 49 S.Ct. 321 (1929). The opinion made no mention of the contrary 
line of authority initiated by the Conard case. Accord: New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 
53 S.Ct. 323 (1933); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 62 S.Ct. 350 (1941). These 
decisions questioned whether a prior mortgage would prevail over §3466, since under the 
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antecedent statutory liens because the lienor had failed to bring 
himself within the exception to the sweeping dictum of the 
Thelusson case: the lien had not been perfected by a seizure or 
execution sufficient to divest the insolvent debtor of title or pos-
session in the property and legally sever that property from the 
general assets of the debtor at the time the United States priority 
arose. The earlier unperfected, and thus inchoate, lien was sub-
ordinated to the priority demanded by section 3466. 
Although the Supreme Court has never found a "choate lien" 
in a section 3466 insolvency case, the decisions have crystallized 
four prerequisites to the existence of such a specific and perfected 
lien. The first three requirements are principally concerned with 
the specificity of all liens: identity of the lienor,18 identity of the 
property subject to the lien,19 and certainty of the amount secured 
by the lien.20 The fourth requirement relates primarily to the 
perfection of a non-possessory lien by divesting the debtor of title 
or possession in the liened property, thus severing that property 
from his general assets.21 The result reached in United States v. 
Gilbert Associates, Inc.,22 indicates that despite the disjunctive in 
"title or possession," it may be insufficient to divest the debtor 
merely of his title. In the Gilbert Associates case, the city had 
foreclosed its own tax liens and purchased the tax titles at the fore-
closure sale. The debtor, however, was left in possession of the 
property. The Court, holding that the priority of the United 
States was to be first satisfied, found that the lien of the city lacked 
perfection because the debtor had not been divested of possession.23 
The reversion to the sweeping dictum of the Thelusson case has 
been accompanied by a change of emphasis in the relative superi-
ority between the priority statute and choate liens. The Conard 
decision clearly implied the possibility that a choate lien would 
lien theory the debtor is not divested of either title or possession. The Government's 
theory that everything short of payment must be done to perfect a lien makes even a 
mortgage inchoate as it must be foreclosed for payment. Contra, Savings &: Loan Society 
v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421, 18 S.Ct. 392 (1898). 
18 United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 56 S.Ct. 902 (1936). [Dictum that a choate lien 
bars the priority of section 3466 was disapproved in United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 
62 S.Ct. 350 (1941)]. 
19 United States v. Waddill, Holland &: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 65 S.Ct. 304 (1945); 
Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 67 S.Ct. 340 (1946). 
20 United States v. Waddill, Holland &: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 65 S.Ct. 304 (1945). 
21 See the cases cited in note 19 supra. The requirement that the lienor divest the 
debtor of title creates a conceptual dilemma: when a lienor acquires title, his lien "merges 
into" the greater title interest and ceases to exist separately as a lien, and, as owner, he 
would no longer need the protection of a choate lien. 
22 345 U.S. 361, 73 S.Ct. 701 (1953). 
23 United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 at 366, 73 S.Ct. 689 (1953). 
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prevail ov~r a "mere priority" of the United States.24 More re-
cently, however, the Court has stated, " ... the Court has never de-
cided whether the priority [ of the United States] is ov~rcome by a 
fully perfected and specific lien,"25 thus implying the possibility 
of what Justice Minton has termed an "absolute priority"26 for the 
Government in cases of insolvency. In the section 3466 cases thus 
far decided the Court has uniformly held that all the creditors' 
liens examined lacked the degree of specificity or perfection re-
quired in order to become choate. As a result, the Court has not 
yet had to decide whether or not a choate lien is in fact superior 
to the priority created by section 3466. Although an absolute 
priority construction would be supported by the statutory lan-
guage, such a construction would mean that the entire develop-
ment of the concept of a choate lien as a possible exception to the 
federal priority was unnecessary. 
IL THE CHOATE LIEN AND THE TAX LIEN STATUTE 
A. Prerequisites for a Choate Lien. The requirements of 
specificity and perfection which a lien must satisfy in order to be-
come "choate," as developed in the insolvency cases arising under 
section 3466, have been watered down when transferred to the tax 
lien cases. Thus, in order to have the protection of choate lien 
priority as against a subsequent tax lien, the lienor need not divest 
the debtor-tax.payer of title or possession in the liened property. 
In the Gilbert Associates case the Government asserted priority 
under an unrecorded tax lien and the priority statute. The city 
claimed that it had become a judgment creditor by operation of a 
state statute relating to tax assessments and that it was, therefore, 
within the protection of section 6323 which declares that an un-
recorded tax lien "shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, 
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has 
been filed .... "27 The Supreme Court treated the general tax liens 
of both the town and the United States _as equally perfected, but 
denied priority to the town's lien solely on the basis that the town 
24 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 386 at 441, 444 (1828). 
25 Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 at 370, 67 S.Ct. 340 (1946). See also United States 
v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 at 488, 62 S.Ct. 350 (1941); United States v. Waddill, Holland &: 
Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 at 358, 65 S.Ct. 304 (1945). 
26 See United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 at 85, 74 S.Ct. 367 (1954). 
27 I.R.C. (1954), §6323, formerly I.R.C. (1939), §3672. Consistent parallel construction 
bas led some courts to hold that §6323 impliedly amends the priority provision of §3466 
so that a judgment creditor would prevail even though be bad not levied on bis judgment 
lien, thus modifying the result of the Tbelusson case. See In re Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. 
Super. 296, 48 A. (2d) 210 (1946); Bishop v. Black, 233 N.C. 333, 64 S.E. (2d) 167 (1951). 
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was not a judgment creditor in the conventional sense of the term, 
and thus was not within protection of section 6323. The Court 
did not decide whether the town had a choate lien superior to the 
tax lien, but considered only the Government's claim of priority 
under section 3466. Priority was awarded to the Government on 
the basis of section 3466 alone, because the town had not perfected 
its lien by divesting the debtor of title or possession before the 
priority of the Government attached. If the divestment require-
ment applied in the tax lien situation, the Court could have held 
for the Government on the basis of the tax lien alone.28 
The implication that an antecedent lienor need not divest the 
taxpayer of title or possession in order to obtain a choate lien as 
against the subsequent tax lien was confirmed in United States v. 
New Britain.29 In that case the city's tax liens were held to be 
choate from the date they attached to the realty, even though the 
taxpayer had not been divested of title or possession before the 
federal tax lien arose. The Court attempted to distinguish the 
Gilbert Associates case on the ground that personalty was involved 
in that case, whereas realty was involved in the New Britain case. 
This distinction is of doubtful soundness inasmuch as the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court in the Gilbert Associates case had held 
the property to be realty.30 Moreover, in listing the characteristics 
of a choate lien ( certainty of the amount of the lien, identity of the 
lienor, and the property subject to the lien) the Court was silent 
with regard to any requirement that the lienor must divest the 
debtor of title or possession in the liened property.31 Entirely 
apart from the merits of the divestment requirement, it is clear 
that the prerequisites to the existence of a choate lien should be 
the same in both the tax lien and priority statute cases. The 
choate lien concept is judicial gloss resulting from the Court's 
interpretation and correlation of the two statutes. Having created 
the choate lien standard, the Court should apply an identical 
definition in the two types of cases. 
Under existing decisions, however, the antecedent lien ap-
parently need only be specific and perfected as to amount, lienor, 
and property at the time the tax lien is created in order to be 
within the Court-created "choate lien" exception to the priority 
of the tax lien. However, the Court, has relied on extremely 
28 Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career 
of the Inchoate and General Lien," 63 YALE L.J. 905 at 927 (1954). 
29 347 U.S. 81, 74 S.Ct. 367 (1953). 
30 Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411 at 414, 90 A. (2d) 499 (1952). 
81 347 U.S. 81 at 84, 74 S.Ct. 367 (1953). 
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speculative contingencies in order to find inchoate a lien that a 
state court has described as specific and perfected under state law.32 
The attachment lien in the Security Trust case was found to be 
inchoate because the lien would terminate under state law if three 
years elapsed without any judgment rendered in the cause. It was 
immaterial that the lienor in fact recovered judgment within three 
years, because the judgment came after the tax lien arose. In an-
other case a landlord's distress lien was rendered contingent and 
inchoate because, at the time the tax lien arose, two days remained 
in which the tenant could have posted a bond and removed the 
lien from his property.33 Again, it was immaterial that the tenant 
entered into an insolvency receivership the next day so that a bond 
was never posted.34 
B. The Choate Lien Mirage. It is doubtful whether a credi-
tor with a garnishment, or other statutory lien would be able to 
eliminate the contingent nature of his lien prior to judgment and 
thereby secure a choate lien before the tax lien comes into ex-
istence. In many states a lien is not even perfected by state stand-
ards until the lienor obtains judgment.35 While perfection is a 
federal question and state standards are not controlling,36 a gar-
nishment lien followed by a judgment against the principal debtor 
b_efore the tax lien arises on the property of that debtor, should be 
the latest stage at which the contingencies would be eliminated 
and the lien perfected for purposes of the Court's "choate lien" ex-
ception.37 A judgment would fix the amount of the lien on the 
debt owed by the garnishee because the doctrine of res judicata 
would bar any later objection by the debtor to the amount awarded 
by the judgment. If a statute did not make the judgment itself a 
lien, the creditor would at least be a judgment creditor with a 
32Whether a lien is choate is a federal question. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 
75 S.Ct. 239 (1955). This was earlier classified as a question of state law in Spokane County 
v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 at 94, 49 S.Ct. 321 (1929). A state court's characterization of 
a lien as choate is not conclusive; but as inchoate, it is practically conclusive. Illinois v. 
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 at 371, 67 S.Ct. 340 (1946). 
ss United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218, 75 S.Ct. 244 (1955). 
34 In United States v. Waddill, Holland &: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 at 357-358, 65 S.Ct. 
304 (1945), the possibilities that the rent might have been miscalculated, or already paid, 
or subject to set-offs made the landlord's distress lien inchoate. It was immaterial that none 
of these defenses were asserted by the tenant. The Court cited §3466 cases as authority for 
finding an inchoate lien in tax lien cases. 
35 See note 70 infra. 
36 See note 32 supra. 
37 But see Miller v. Bank of America, (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 415, holding that a 
judgment creditor with an attachment lien must also have a prior execution lien on the 
attached asset in order to prevail over a subsequent tax lien. See also T.D. 6119, Int. Rev. 
Bui. No. 3, p. 7 at 26 (1955); H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. A407 (1954). 
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garnishment lien on the debt, thus identifying the specific property 
subject to the lien. Further perfection would require the creditor 
to divest the debtor of title or possession by a levy upon and sale 
of the garnished debt, thus discharging the lien and eliminating any 
question of priority.38 It may be assumed, therefore, that the 
Court would find a garnishment lien perfected by judgment suf-
ficient to be choate. In effect, then, a creditor who has an antece-
dent lien must also become a judgment creditor before the tax 
lien arises in order to be within the Court's "choate lien" excep-
tion to the priority of a subsequent tax lien. If this is so, the 
Court's exception in favor of a choate lien has, in substance, been 
equated with the exception of section 6323 in favor of a "judgment 
creditor" with a lien,39 one of the four classes of interests protected 
by that section. As a practical result, no interests other than those 
expressly enumerated in section 6323, even though created before 
the tax lien arises, can prevail over the subsequent tax lien. Con-
versely, only those four classes of interests found in that section, 
whether arising before or after the tax lien comes into existence 
(but before the tax lien is recorded), can prevail over the tax lien. 
Such an interpretation gained its first judicial acceptance in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in the Security Trust case40 
in which the majority relied upon the failure of the earlier lien to 
be "choate" in order to sustain the priority of a subsequent tax 
lien. This interpretation may have been accepted by the entire 
Court in a recent deci~ion where the Court said: "The landlord 
had a lien other than a mortgage, pledge, or judgment lien. As to 
all other liens ... [section] 3672 ... afforded no protection. 
United States v. Security Trust Co . ... (concurring opinion)."41 
The quoted statement must be read in the context of the fact that 
the tax lien was the antecedent lien. The absolutism of the state-
38 The divestment requirement applies only in the §3466 cases, not in the tax lien 
cases. See part II-A of this comment. Even if applicable in the tax lien cases, a garnish-
ment deprives fhe principal debtor of many rights of ownership in his debt claim, thus 
substantially divesting him of title. See notes 69-73 infra. The requirement that the 
principal debtor be divested of possession was developed in reference to tangible property 
and is inappropriate in this context because an intangible debt is primarily a relationship 
between two parties and, thus, incapable of possession. 
39 Although §6323 literally protects a "judgment creditor," this has been construed 
to mean a judgment creditor with a lien. See note 37 supra. ' 
40 United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 at 51, 71 S.Ct. 111 
(1950). This was anticipated in MacKenzie v. United States, (9th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 
540 (dictum, since tax lien had priority anyway). 
41 United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 at 220. See also United States v. White 13ear 
Drewing Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 359 at 368-369, revd. without majority opinion 
(U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 646. (See particularly the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in 
the latter case). 
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ment, plus the citation of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, 
may possibly mean that the Court would have reached the same 
result (granting priority to the tax lien) for the same reason (land-
lord's lien not enumerated, and thus not protected by section 
6323) had the creditor's lien been prior in time to the federal tax 
lien. Since the choate lien exception prptects only a creditor with 
an earlier choate statutory lien as against a later tax lien, and since 
the tax lien was prior in time, the creditor could never have pre-
vailed by merely having a choate lien, but only by becoming a 
judgment creditor within the protection of section 6323 before 
the tax lien was recorded. The further declaration that the lien 
was inchoate is thus superfluous except insofar as it may show that 
a creditor with an inchoate lien must necessarily become a judg-
ment creditor in order to make his lien choate. 
Justice Jackson's interpretation finds no support in the his-
torical origin or in the subsequent history of the statutory excep-
tion. The tax lien statute as originally enacted42 contained no 
exception provision. One of the first tax lien cases decided by the 
Supreme Court held that an antecedent secret tax lien prevailed 
over a subsequent purchaser without notice from the taxpayer.43 
To correct this harsh result, Congress enacted the exception pro-
vision, section 6323.44 Section 6323 was thus initially designed to 
protect subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and judgment credi-
tors who acquired interests in the taxpayer's property after the tax 
lien had arisen but before it was recorded. There is no reason to 
believe that Congress intended that the 1913 amendment should 
also limit the antecedent interests which could have priority over 
subsequent tax liens only to those classes expressly enumerated in 
section 6323, because cases of this type were never litigated before 
the Supreme Court until the Security Trust case in 1950, nor be-
fore lower courts in any substantial number until the 1930's. The 
more logical conclusion is that both before and after the 1913 
amendment, Congress believed that no provision was necessary to 
protect prior interests because they would be protected by the 
usual priority rule of first in time, first in right. This conclusion 
is supported by the House Report accompanying the 1913 amend-
ment which stated, in part, that " [ t ]here is no reason why the gov-
ernment should not occupy the same position with reference to 
4214 Stat. L. 101 (1866). 
43 United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 13 S.Ct. 846 (1893). There was no implication 
of what the result would have been if the purchase preceded the tax lien. 
44 That this was the purpose behind §6323, see United States v. Gilbert Associates, 
Inc., 345 U.S. 361 at 363, 73 S.Ct. 689 (1953). 
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liens on property as does the individual."45 Moreover, in 1939 
Congress added "pledgees"46 to the class of interests protected by 
section 6323 in direct response to a decision holding an earlier 
unrecorded tax lien prior to a later pledge lien.47 At this time, a 
substantial number of lower federal court decisions48 had already 
held that an antecedent "inchoate" statutory lien had priority 
over a subsequent tax lien, the fact that the statutory lien was 
"inchoate" at the time the tax lien arose being immaterial. Con-
gress did and said nothing about this interpretation of the tax lien 
statute. This indicates that Congress intended (1) the usual rule 
of priority-first in time, first in right-to continue to be applied 
as between statutory, though inchoate, liens and tax liens; and (2) 
the purpose of section 6323 to be the same as when passed in 1913, 
i.e., to reverse the usual rules of priority only when any one of the 
enumerated interests was acquired subsequent to the tax lien but 
before the tax lien was recorded. 
Although this legislative history indicates that section 6323 
should have no relation to the choate lien concept, the analysis 
immediately preceding that history concluded that the Court now 
follows Justice Jackson's view that only those four interests enu-
merated in section 6323 prevail over a later federal tax lien, and 
that therefore a lien is inchoate until it is reduced to judgment, 
thus making the lienor a "judgment creditor." The ambiguous 
per curiam decision in United States v. White Bear Brewing Go.48a 
raises the question of whether the Court has gone even farther in 
upholding the priority of a subsequent tax lien. The dissenting 
opinion indicates that there are two possible interpretations of the 
decision which gave a tax lien priority over a mechanic's lien 
which had been filed and was being foreclosed at the time the tax 
lien arose. 
On the one hand, if the majority decided that the mechanic's 
lien was inchoate, then the decision is consistent with the basic 
principle that an inchoate lien has no priority over a subsequent 
tax lien. Since the lien could have been further perfected only 
by entry of a decree of foreclosure and sale, the decision supports 
the conclusion that a lien is inchoate until reduced to judgment by 
45 H. Rep. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d sess., p. 2 (1912) (the quoted statement points to a 
broader policy than the specific situation before Congress). 
46 I.R.C. (1939), §3672. 
47 United States v. Rosenfield, (D.C. Mich. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 433. 
48 See the cases cited in Kennedy, "The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: 
The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien," 63 YALE L.J. 905 at 924, n. 115 
(1954). 
48a (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 646. 
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the lienor who thereby becomes a judgment creditor with a choate 
lien protected by section 6323. 
On the other hand, as the dissent interpreted the per curiam 
decision, the majority may have decided that the lien was in fact 
choate but the lienor could not prevail against a subsequent tax 
lien because he was not yet a judgment creditor protected by sec• 
tion 6323. This is an extreme application of Justice Jackson's 
view that only the four classes of interests expressed in section 
6323 (thus literally excluding a choate lien) have priority over a 
tax lien. If this is the rationale of the White Bear decision, what 
impact will this have on mortgage and pledge liens? As long as 
the Court adheres to Justice Jackson's interpretation of section 
6323, antecedent mortgage and pledge liens will have priority over 
a subsequent tax lien because, and only because, they are expressly 
protected by section 6323. But if the Court should limit the pro-
tection of section 6323 to its original purpose so that it only gives 
a subsequent mortgage or pledge lien priority over an earlier but 
unrecorded tax lien, then antecedent choate mortgage and pledge 
liens would not have priority over a subsequent tax lien. If a tax 
lien has a prior right of satisfaction out of a taxpayer's property 
in which a creditor has an antecedent choate lien property interest, 
then the income tax itself has the same effect as a direct tax levied 
upon the creditor solely because of his ownership of that choate 
lien property interest. Thus the Court in effect allows a direct tax 
to be levied without apportionment. Moreover, to satisfy a tax 
lien ahead of an existing choate lien interest in the taxpayer's 
property is to deprive the lienor of his property without due proc-
ess· of law in order to satisfy the tax of the taxpayer.48h 
C. Correlation of Priority. The parallel construction by 
which the priority of the tax lien is correlated with the priority 
statute, section 3466, is open to substantial-criticism. The priori-
ty statute is a congressional determination that when all of the 
property of the debtor is involved in insolvency, the debts due the 
· United States will be accorded priority. As a historical matter the 
priority language of section 3466 is derived from a similar provi-
sion in the Act of 179749 which was intended primarily to protect 
48b The label "inchoate" means that tax-wise the lienor's interest in the taxpayer's 
property is so imperfect that priority of a tax lien does not give the income tax the 
effect of a direct tax upon that interest. To the extent that the Court may later admit to 
having been wrong in labeling as inchoate a lien interest which should be regarded as 
choate, it can be argued that there has been, in effect, a direct tax and a deprival of prop• 
erty without due process of law. . 
491 Stat. L. 515 (1797). This act was construed in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 
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the revenues in the event of insolvency of a collector of customs 
duties.50 Since the revenues in that era depended principally upon 
customs, and since there were relatively few collectors, the in-
solvency of any one collector could have substantially lessened the 
revenues. The historical purpose of section 3466 is in part respon-
sible for the inconsistent priority policy whereby debts due the 
United States are accorded a higher priority in the insolvency 
cases controlled by section 3466 than in the bankruptcy cases 
governed by the Bankruptcy Act.151 In bankruptcy liquidation 
Congress has decided that the prior satisfaction of certain other 
claims is more equitable and more in the public interest than the 
protection of revenues by an absolute priority,52 and has deliberate-
ly subordinated protection of revenue as a matter of policy. 
Similarly, in order to facilitate the collection of taxes Congress 
created a general tax lien, but without any provision for priority 
or superiority over other interests. The absence of express legis-
lation declaring that the tax lien is to have a special priority over 
other liens indicates that Congress probably intended the priority 
of the tax lien to be governed by the general principle that the lien 
prior in time is prior in right, without regard to the specificity or 
perfection of the competing liens. The collection of revenues 
would thus be subordinated to the satisfaction of the more equit-
able claim of a prior lien consistently with the policy expressed in 
the Bankruptcy Act. Under this analysis the Supreme Court in 
the Security Trust case overstated the purpose of the tax lien to be 
"to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes."53 When the 
Court used this purpose as the rationale for its decision that the 
(6 U.S.) 358 (1805), to apply whenever any person became insolvent. Prior statutes had 
limited the priority strictly to cases where the insolvent was indebted on a bond for pay-
ment of duties [I Stat. L. 42 (1789), 1 Stat. L. 169 (1790), 1 Stat. L. 263 (1792)] as did a 
later statute [l Stat. L. 676 (1799)]. 
50 If the insolvent collected the customs as agent for the Government, the use of the 
funds for his own purposes would be conversion. Under a theory of rightful withdrawal, 
the customs duties would be traced into the remaining assets of the insolvent. The United 
States as owner would have an absolute priority over other creditors of the insolvent. 
5130 Stat. L. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 et seq. 
52 See, e.g., §64 (a) (4) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. L. 563 (1898), as 
amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §104 (a)(4) and (4) [unsecured tax and debt claims of United 
States share a fourth and fifth rung priority respectively with other tax and debt claims]; 
and §67 (c) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. L. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) 
§107 (c) (1) [tax lien on personalty, without possession thereof, subordinated to priorities 
in §64 (a) (1) and (2)]. An unrecorded tax lien has been held void as against the trustee 
as a judgment creditor under I.R.C. (1954), §6323. In re Sport Coal Co., (D.C. W.Va. 
1954) 125 F. Supp. 517. Contra: In the Matter of Green, (D.C. Ala. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 
481; In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., (D.C. Mich. 1951) 110 F. Supp. 111. 
53 340 U.S. 47 at 51, 71 S.Ct. 111 (1950) (italics added). 
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tax lien must be prior to an earlier "inchoate" lien, the Court gave 
greater priority to the tax lien than the statute would seem to 
justify.54 
On the other hand, in both the Bankruptcy Act and in the 
priority statute, Congress has exercised its power55 to declare that 
a claim for taxes and debts due the United States shall have a spe-
cial priority over any other claim, without regard to the relative 
priority in time or secured nature of the competing claims. But in 
the tax lien statute, Congress created a general lien without so 
exercising that power. The conclusion reached in the preceding 
paragraph was that Congress intended the tax lien priority to be 
governed by the usual rule that the lien prior in time is prior in 
right, regardless of whether or not the prior lien is choate. A cor-
relation of the priority of the tax lien with statutory priorities 
designed for the special insolvency or bankruptcy case would seem 
to defeat, rather than effectuate, the intent of Congress. 
III. PRIORITY POLICY AND THE CHOATE LIEN 
A. Priority Premises. All courts, litigants and writers are in 
complete accord with the basic assumption that priority is to be 
determined by the principle that the lien prior in time is prior in 
right. Opinion differs, however, on the premise of what kind of 
lien prior in time should be prior in right. Since the Court has 
adopted the premise that the lien first in time to become choate is 
first in right, the Court should require both a creditor's lien and a 
tax lien to meet the same standards of specificity and perfection in 
order to become choate. Applying the Court's definition of a 
"'choate lien," a recorded tax lien, lacking both specificity and per-
fection56 should be inchoate. The Court, however, treats an un-
recorded tax lien as equivalent to a choate lien from the time it 
arises.57 The failure of the Court to apply an identical definition 
54 The principle that a subsequent tax lien has priority over an antecedent statutory 
lien which is inchoate as of the time the tax lien arises, even though made choate there• 
after, conflicts with the policy of the act which allows later perfection of certain statutory 
liens which are inchoate as of the initiation of proceedings, which is the analogous pivotal 
date line on which the priorities established by the act arise. These liens will then be 
valid against the trustee and hence superior to the priorities established by the act. Section 
67 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. L. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §107 (b). 
55 U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, art. VI. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 at 93, 
49 S.Ct. 321 (1929). Since the United States does not succeed to the prerogatives of the 
Crown, priority is not an attribute of sovereignty, but must be created by statute. United 
States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 29 (1832). 
56 Recording merely states that there is a lien on "all the property • • . belonging to 
the taxpayer," without describing such property. Besides lacking specificity, the tax lien 
also lacks perfection until a levy of distraint pursuant to I.R.C. (1954), §6331. 
57 United States v. City of Greenville, (4th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 963 at 965. 
1956] COMMENTS 843 
of what constitutes a choate lien has resulted in an inchoate federal 
tax lien having priority over both earlier inchoate and subsequent 
choate statutory liens. One writer has attempted to justify this 
result as a matter of policy on the assumption that revenue de-
mands are more in the public interest than private claims.58 This 
as~umption begs the question of what constitutes "public interest." 
It is extremely doubtful whether the public interest is furthered 
by the unorthodox priority of tax liens. The loss of a disputed 
claim is more easily absorbed by the government, and, conversely, 
is harder on the financial position of an individual creditor. 
Sounder results, policy-wise, would be reached if priority were 
based on the premise that the lien first in time to be created pre-
vails even though inchoate. Not only would this set the same 
standard of priority for the competing tax and statutory liens in 
each case, but this would also make the principle of tax lien priori-
ty consistent with general principles of lien priority. When a 
creditor has done enough to obtain a lien which is preferred under 
state laws to subsequent liens, he should also prevail over a sub-
sequent tax lien. It is submitted that this was the policy intended 
by Congress in expressly declaring that the Government should be 
in the same position as individuals with reference to liens on prop-
erty.59 
B. A Threshold Issue. Only after the initial decision has 
been made that both liens reach the same property of the taxpayer-
debtor can the question arise as to which of the liens has a prior 
right to satisfaction. So far, this comment has proceeded upon 
the premise that both of the liens did reach the same property. 
This premise itself must now be examined. 
The principle that a lien can reach only those rights which the 
debtor himself has in his property prevents the federal tax lien 
from attaching to any more or any greater property interests than 
the taxpayer has at the time the tax lien arises. 60 The statutory 
provision that the tax shall be a lien upon the taxpayer's "property 
58 Samer, "Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes," 
95 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 739 (1947). 
59 See note 45 supra. Moreover, "floating liens" on after-acquired property would 
have priority as of the date the lien initially arises. This type of lien is inchoate under 
present law because the property subject to the lien is not sufficiently identified. Illinois 
v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 67 S.Ct. 340 (1946). 
60 United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408, 45 S.Ct. 322 (1925); Shaw v. United States, 
(D.C. Mich. 1939) 94 F. Supp. 245; United States v. Winnett, (9th Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 
149; In re Boylan, (D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 105; Great American Indemnity Co. v. 
United States, (D.C. La. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 445; Kinart v. Churchill, 210 Iowa 72, 230 
N.W. 349 (1930). 4 CAsEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE §14.27 (1955). 
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and rights to property" thus creates the threshold issue of deter-
mining the quantity of rights and interest that the taxpayer re-
tains in his property after a creditor has obtained a garnishment 
lien upon it. 
A preliminary question is whether the extent and quantity of 
the taxpayer's property interests and rights to be reached by the 
tax lien are to be determined under state law or federal law. Su-
preme Court decisions involving the tax lien have been silent on 
this entire problem. In cases involving the interpretation of other 
tax provisions the Supreme Court has held that where Congress 
has not expressly defined those interests which will be deemed to 
be included within the property concept used in a statute, the state. 
law controls in determining the nature of legal interests and the 
rights of .the taxpayer in the property sought to be reached by the 
taxing statute.61 It should be remembered that the question is 
not whether Congress has the power to declare that the tax lien 
shall be a first lien, 62 but, rather, what Congress intended to in-
clude by the unqualified phrase "property and rights to property." 
Since Congress has not defined the content or scope of that phrase, 
the conclusion seems justified that Congress intended that state 
property law should _determine the quantity and extent of the 
property rights and interests which the taxpayer actually owns, 
until it should specifically declare what other interests are to be 
included within the phrase "property and rights to property." 
Thus the scope of the tax lien, insofar as the extent of property 
attached is concerned, depends upon state property law for a de-
termination of the property interests and rights actually owned 
by the taxpayer.63 Once that determination is made, the tax lien 
attaches to all property interests and rights owned by the taxpayer. 
State law cannot thereafter restrict or affect the operation of the 
tax lien upon the property attached.64 So long as state law is to 
61 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Gt. 424 (1940); Tyler v. United States, 
281 U.S. 497, 50 S.Ct. 356 (1930). Compare United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 46 
S.Ct. 148 (1926) with United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 51 S.Ct. 184 (1931) and Poe 
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58 (1930). See also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938); 4 CAsEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE §§13.33-13.40 (1955); lOA 
MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§61.08, 61.09 (citing cases contra), 61.12 
(1948). 
62 See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 424 (1940); Tyler v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 497, 50 S.Ct. 356 (1930). See H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. A406 
(1954); S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 575 (1954). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §5004(a) (I). 
63 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 74 (1932). . 
64 Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 63 S.Ct. 302 (1943); United States v. City 
of Greenville, (4th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 963; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, (D.C. 
Md. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 701. 
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define the quantum of rights and interest remaining in the tax-
payer's property, to allow the tax lien to reach greater interests is 
essentially to take the property of A to pay the tax of B. 
This, then, raises the final question of what property interests 
or rights to property are retained by the debtor-taxpayer after the 
debt owing to him has been garnished. Since garnishment is en-
tirely a statutory procedure, the effect of service of a writ on the 
rights of both the garnishor and the debtor-taxpayer depends upon 
a construction of the individual state statute.65 
Under some statutes garnishment does not create a lien, but is 
a warning to the garnishee that if he voluntarily pays the debt to 
anyone else, he remains personally liable to the garnishor.66 The 
creditor acquires no interest in the garnished debt, and the prin-
cipal debtor's interest in his debt claim is unaffected, at least until 
the garnishor obtains an execution lien upon the debt. A tax lien 
arising after the garnishment bµt before the execution lien would 
be a first lien on the debt and entitled to priority.67 The statutes 
involved in the tax lien cases under discussion provide that service 
of garnishment creates a lien on the garnished debt.68 This lien 
may be construed by the state court to be vested69 (perfected be-
fore judgment), or inchoate70 (perfected by a judgment removing 
all contingencies and making it enforceable against the garnishee). 
Courts speak of garnishment liens as assignments of the debtor's 
rights in the property to the garnishor;71 this, however, is only a 
conclusion. Of central importance are the rights which the prin-
cipal debtor can still assert in his claim after the garnishment. It 
has been said that the principal debtor's rights are excluded or 
extinguished to the extent necessary to prevent interference with 
65 In re Marsters, (7th Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 365. See the dissenting opinion in 
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 at 206, 54 S.Ct. 677 (1934). 
66 Bigelow v. Andress, 31 Ill. 322 (1863); Newberry v. Meadows Fertilizer Co., 203 N.C. 
330, 166 S.E. 79 (1932). 
67 Relation back of the execution lien to the time of the garnishment would not affect 
the prior intervening tax lien. United States v. Security Trust &: Savings Ban1c, 340 U.S. 
47, 71 S.Ct. 111 (1950). 
68 See Mussman and Riesenfeld, "Garnishment and Bankruptcy," 27 MINN. L. REv. I 
at 17-55 (1942) for representative statutes. 
69 E.g., Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. (2d) 608, 209 P. (2d) 657 (1949), revd. 
sub nom. United States v. Security Trust&: Savings Ban1c, 340 U.S. 47, 71 S.Ct. Ill (1950). 
See also the dissenting opinion and cases cited in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 
U.S. 190 at 208, 54 S.Ct. 677 (1934). 
70 Commercial State Ban1c v. Pierce, 176 Iowa 722, 158 N.W. 481 (1916); Anderson v. 
Ashford, 174 Ga. 660, 163 S.E. 741 (1932). See 29 N.C. L REv. 293 (1951). 
71 Farnoff v. Smith, 281 Ill. App. 232 (1935); United States v. Yates, (Tex. Civ. App. 
1947) 204 S.W. (2d) 399. But this does not divest the principal debtor of title or posses-
sion. In re Marsters, (7th Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 365. 
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payment of the garnishor's claim out of the garnished debt.72 The 
debtor has no right to assign the garnished debt free from the lien 
so as to defeat the rights of the garnishor, his right to satisfaction 
from the claim remaining superior to that of the assignee.73 A 
plea of the pending garnishment may bar or abate an action begun 
by the principal debtor against the garnishee.74 Even when a plea 
of the pending garnishment does not abate or bar the action, the 
debtor cannot obtain judgment or satisfaction unless the garnishor 
fails to obtain a judgment against both the garnishee and the 
principal debtor, or unless the debtor satisfies the garnishor's 
claim before the garnishee pays pursuant to a judgment.75 
In Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works,76 the basic issue was 
whether a principal debtor could still assert any rights to the debt 
he held a~inst a garnishee after the creditor had garnished the 
debt but before the creditor obtained judgment against the gar-
nishee. On the ground that garnishment in Illinois created a lien 
on the debt, the majority of the Court held that the creditor had a 
superior right to pursue his garnishment proceeding to judgment 
and satisfaction free from the interference of any claim by the 
principal debtor.77 Thus, if the creditor's garnishment creates 
at least an inchoate lien on the debtor's claim against the garnishee, 
then the most the debtor retains is a contingent right to receive 
the proceeds of his claim if (1) the debtor satisfies the creditor's 
claim before the garnishee pays under the compulsion of a judg-
ment, or (2) the garnishor fails to obtain judgments against both 
the garnishee and the principal debtor. The tax lien, attaching 
only to those property interests and rights to property remaining 
in the taxpayer, would reach only this contingent right to satisfac-
tion left after the prior garnishment. Under this analysis, since 
the tax and garnishment liens would reach entirely different inter-
ests in the taxpayer's property, there would be no need to resort to 
the rules of priority. 
72DRAKE, ATIACHMENT, 7th ed., §§453, 542 (1891). 
73 Filipowicz v. Rothensies, (D.C. Pa. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 716; National Bank of America 
v. Indiana Banking Co., 114 Ill. 483, 2 N.E. 401 (1885); 2 SHINN, ATIACHMENT AND GAR-
NISHMENT §613 (1896). 
:14 Grosslight v. Crisup, 58 Mich. 531 (1885). 
75 Salomon v. Continental Ins. Co., 261 Mass. 360, 158 N.E. 774 (1927). 
76 292 U.S. 190, 54 S.Ct. 677 (1934). A judgment by default had been entered against 
the principal debtor by the Illinois court in which the garnishment proceedings had been 
begun. A judgment is necessary to support a garnishment proceeding in Illinois, but does 
not make the lien choate. 
77 The dissenting opinion argued only that garnishment did not create a lien in 
Illinois. 
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C. The Purpose of Garnishment. Ideally, a creditor who 
must sue for payment is entitled to receive immediate judgment 
and satisfaction. In practice, however, the delay in obtaining a 
judgment enables a debtor to waste his assets, create superior con-
sensual liens on his assets, or so delay this action that another 
creditor starting a later action may obtain judgment first and be 
able to obtain prior execution liens, if not prior satisfaction. 
Statutory garnishment proceedings are designed to protect a credi-
tor against these risks of delay by preserving the debtor's assets in 
the status quo as of the beginning of the action. The diligent cred-
itor using these procedures obtains a valid statutory preference 
over subsequent claimants,78 and is able to gain satisfaction of his 
judgment as quickly as if there had been no delay. The finish line 
in this race of diligence is the acquisition of a preferential lien by 
service of the writ of garnishment and not the perfection of the 
lien by judgment. The right to payment, but not the right of 
priority, is perfected by a judgment. To make perfection de-
pend upon obtaining a judgment is to confuse perfection with 
collection. If a garnishment lien, however inchoate, is to be of 
any value, it must give the creditor priority over a subsequent lien 
intervening before the creditor obtains judgment.79 A garnish-
ment lien is intended to preserve certain assets pending trial, but 
no creditor wishes to incur the costs and risks of garnishment mere-
ly to preserve the asset for the satisfactiori of a subsequent tax lien. 
When the possibility exists that a subsequent tax lien might nullify . 
his inchoate lien priority, a creditor is forced to elect between tak-
ing this risk or foregoing garnishment, relying solely upon ex-
ecution of judgment for protection. The latter course exposes 
the creditor to all the risks intended to be avoided by garnishment 
proceedings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The determination of when a lien is choate is a federal ques-
tion. Only once, and then in the case of a municipality's tax lien, 
has this question been determined in favor of the holder of the 
antecedent lien.80 Since a private creditor's lien has never been 
held to be choate, there is no concrete example of what may con-
stitute a choate lien or how such a lien may be obtained. More-
over, the promised priority for a choate statutory lien will require 
78 In re Snitzer, (7th Cir. 1932) 62 F. (2d) 285. 
79 See 29 N.C. L. REv. 293 at 299 (1951). 
SO United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 74 S.CL 367 (1953). 
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still more litigation in order to define precisely what is meant by a 
choate lien, and to determine whether a lien may become choate 
at some stage short of final judgment for the lienor. The adoption 
of a choate lien doctrine has introduced uncertainty as to priority 
of liens into the law of creditor's rights, an area of law where cer-
tainty is essential. The Supreme Court seems firmly committed 
to its position, and any reversal of priority policy is unlikely. It 
is extremely doubtful that Congress intended the· plain language 
of the tax lien statute to import as esoteric a rule of priority as the 
Court has developed and applied in its decisions. A clear declara-
tion by Congress on the priority status of the federal tax lien is 
necessary in order to clear away the wreckage produced by six 
years of judicial legislation. 
John B. Huck, S.Ed. 
